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NOTES
SELF- INCRIMINATION: TESTIMONIAL VS.
NON-TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE
One may note with alarm or satisfaction that recent judicial de-
cisions have displayed increasing concern for the protection of the
constitutional rights of suspected criminals. This concern spreads
across the full range of the criminal process, from arrest and interro-
gation to eventual trial and possible conviction. The problem posed
by this Note focuses upon the protections afforded a defendant from
involuntary self-incrimination. The scope of this problem necessarily
encompasses a citizen's treatment from the moment he enters the
police station until his trial is completed.
To place the problem area in perspective, consider the circum-
stance of a drunken driving suspect who is being detained at the
police station for questioning and an examination of his intoxicated
condition. This man, hereafter referred to as the defendant, is placed
in a small room with police officers and miscellaneous testing equip-
ment designed to determine the alcohol content of his blood. The
defendant is generally uncooperative and vocally refuses to submit to
coordination tests. Without the defendant's consent, and perhaps
even without his knowledge, the entire scene is preserved by sound
motion pictures. At a subsequent trial, the sound motion picture is
introduced into evidence to show the defendant's demeanor and ap-
pearance. In order to show the slurred speech of the defendant, a
portion of the sound track is played for the jury; by coincidence or
intention, that portion contains the defendant's verbal refusal to
submit to the sobriety and coordination tests. In this situation, the
defendant's reasonable contention could be that such "evidence" vio-
lated his right to be free from compulsory self-incrimination. It is
submitted that the validity of such a contention is primarily dependent
upon whether the sound track of the motion picture is testimonial or
non-testimonial in character. The distinctions between testimonial
and non-testimonial evidence, and which type of evidence is provided
with protection from compulsory self-incrimination, is the thrust of
this Note.
It should be noted that the above "hypothetical" situation is, in
fact, based upon a recent Colorado decision.'
1 Lanford v. People, 409 P.2d 829 (Colo. 1966).
501
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
I. ADMISSIBILITY OF PHOTOGRAPHS AND MOTION PICTURES
A brief reference to these types of evidence will clarify later dis-
cussion. The admissibility of a motion picture is based on the theory
of the admissibility of still photographs, thereby making discussion
of still photographs relevant.
The rule admitting still photographs into evidence is well estab-
lished. It is generally held that photographs of persons, places and
things, when authenticated by a showing that the scene depicted is an
accurate reproduction, are admissible.2 The admission of such a
photograph is discretionary with the trial judge It would seem that
such evidence is admissible whenever it can relevantly supplement
the testimonial descriptions of a witness.4
Photographs commonly depict a scene, object, or person as it or
he was at the time an offense or act occurred. Such evidence assumes
importance when physical appearances have significantly changed and
an essential aspect of the issues presented is appearances as they were
at the time of the commission of the offense5 or happening of the act.
Based on the theory that motion pictures are nothing more than
a series of single or still pictures,6 the rules governing the admissibility
of still photographs are equally applicable to the admissibility of
motion pictures. Motion pictures have been found particularly useful
for the documentation of confessions' and the recordation of interro-
gation and statement signing scenes.'
The use of a motion picture to document a confession would
seem incomplete unless a sound track were included. A California
decision has taken this position by stating that, -[A]s a method of
presenting confessions, sound motion pictures appear to have a
unique advantage in that, while presenting the admission of guilt,
they simultaneously testify to facts relevant to the issue of volition."9
When a prosecutor employs motion pictures and their sound
tracks in his effort to secure a conviction, the question of self-incrimi-
nation may be raised. Clearly, if the movie and sound track pertain
to a voluntary confession, the defendant has manifested his consent
2 Potts v. People, 114 Colo. 253, 158 P.2d 739 (1945).
3 Ibid.
4 See Martinez v. People, 124 Colo. 170, 235 P.2d 810 (1951).
5 State v. Sanders, 358 S.W.2d 45 (Mo. 1962) ; accord, Vigil v. People, 134 Colo. 126,
300 P.2d 545 (1956) ; State v. Hughes, 244 La. 774, 154 So. 2d 395 (1963).
6Heiman v. Market St. Ry. Co., 21 Cal. App. 2d 311, 69 P.2d 178 (1937) ; House-
wright v. State, 154 Tex. Crim. 101, 225 S.W.2d 417 (1949).
7 Grant v. State, 171 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 1965).
8 Hammil v. People, 145 Colo. 577, 361 P.2d 117, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 903 (1961);
Martinez v. People, 124 Colo. 170, 235 P.2d 810 (1951).
9 People v. Dabb, 32 Cal. App. 2d 491, 495, 197 P.2d 1, 5 (1948) (voluntary re-enact-
ment of robbery and murder by accused).
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to self-incrimination. But not infrequently, the motion picture is
taken without the defendant's consent or even his knowledge, raising
the defense of compulsory self-incrimination in contravention of the
privilege contained in the United States Constitution" and many state
constitutions."
II. TESTIMONIAL OR NON-TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE
A. Types of Evidence
There appears to be a confusion of meaning between "evidence"
and "testimony." An apparent minority of courts have held either
that testimony means all evidence or that testimony is synonymous
with the term evidence. 2 However, the better reasoned decisions hold
that "evidence" is inclusive of "testimony," and thus that testimony
is merely a particular kind of evidence. 3 A case illustrative of this
concept stated,
Is there not a difference between giving evidence and being a witness
(which implies testimonial evidence only) ? The word evidence is a
broad embracing term, including all classes of proof, testimonial or
otherwise ....
'Evidence' is the broader term and includes all testimony, but 'testi-
mony' is accurately used to designate only a particular kind or spe-
cies of evidence .... 14
Having noted that "evidence" and "testimony" are not synony-
mous, the phrase "testimonial evidence" requires further definition.
Testimonial evidence is that evidence which is the result of a witness
having made a statement or given non-physical evidence under oath."
It would seem, therefore, that the elements of testimonial evidence
are three: (1) a witness; (2) an oath; and (3) communication of
evidence, written or oral, by the witness, to the tribunal.
10 U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person .. shall be compelled in any criminal case to be
a witness against himself .... ).
11 See, e.g., COLO. CONST. art. II, § 18 ("No person shall be compelled to testify against
himself in a criminal case ....").
12 See Aldrich v. State, 220 Ga. 132, 137 S.E.2d 463 (1964) ; Roberts v. Carlson, 142
Neb. 857, 8 N.W.2d 175 (1943) ; United States v. Clark, 5 Utah 226, 14 Pac. 288
(1887).
13 Stern v. Superior Court, 78 Cal. App. 2d 9, 177 P.2d 308 (1947) (testimony limited
to evidence given by witnesses under oath or affirmation) ; Columbia Nat'l Bank v.
German Nat'l Bank, 56 Neb. 803, 77 N.W. 346 (1898) (testimony is a species of
evidence given orally by witnesses); Worland v. McGill, 26 Ohio App. 442, 160
N.E. 478 (1927) (evidence includes exhibits; testimony does not); Hendrickson v.
Myers, 393 Pa. 224, 144 A.2d 367 (1958) (evidence including everything submitted
to the jury) ; Crooks v. Harmon, 29 Utah 304, 81 Pac. 95 (1905) (testimony is evi-
dence but evidence may or may not be testimony).
14 Bednarik v. Bednarik, 18 N.J. Misc. 633, 643, 16 A.2d 80, 89 (1940).
"5E.g., People v. Krotz, 341 I11. 214, 172 N.E. 135 (1930) ; Flick v. Gately, 328 I11.
App. 81, 65 N.E.2d 137 (1946); Meyers v. State, 112 Neb. 149, 198 N.W. 871
(1924); People v. Chu, 193 Misc. 1043, 85 N.Y.S.2d 436 (1949); Baker v. Wood-




At the point of oral communication with the tribunal, a witness
may assert the privilege against self-incrimination only in the context
of "testimonial compulsion."1  This compulsion can be best under-
stood by reference to the aforementioned elements of testimonial evi-
dence. The first two elements and an order of the court compelling
a witness to communicate with the tribunal results in testimonial
compulsion. Thus, it shall be found that the testimonial or non-
testimonial nature of the "evidence" determines the validity of in-
voking the privilege against self-incrimination.
During an investigation of this privilege, Wigmore concluded
that "the history of the privilege ... suggests that the privilege is
limited to testimonial disclosures. It was directed at the employment
of legal process to extract from the person's own lips an admission
of guilt, which would thus take the place of other evidence."' 7 Recog-
nizing the importance of the distinctions between testimonial and
non-testimonial evidence, Wigmore, in a later section of his book,
stated that,
From the general principle (§ 2263 supra) it results that an
inspection of the bodily features by the tribunal or by witnesses
does not violate the privilege because it does not call upon the ac-
cused as a witness-i.e., upon his testimonial responsibility. That
he may in such cases be required sometimes to exercise muscular
action - as when he is required to take off his shoes or roll up his
sleeves - is immaterial, unless all bodily action were synonymous
with testimonial utterance; for ...not compulsion alone is the
component idea of the privilege, but testimonial compulsion. 18
Confining the operation of the privilege solely to testimonial com-
pulsion seems to be the general thrust of case law. " If, in fact, the
privilege is so confined, real or physical evidence (non-testimonial)
which has no element of verbal communication will not be excluded
on the ground of involuntary self-incrimination. This is true even
though the source of the evidence involves fingerprinting," photo-
16 People v. Sykes, 47 Cal. Rptr. 596, 599 (1965 ).
17 8 WIGMORE, EvIDENCE § 2263, at 378 (McNaughton Rev. 1961).
18Id. § 2265, at 386.
29 See, e.g., Gilbert v. United States, 163 F.2d 325 (10th Cir. 1947); People v. Sykes,
47 Cal. Rptr. 596 (1965); Vigil v. People, 134 Colo. 126, 300 P.2d 545 (1956);
Berney v. Volk, 341 Mich. 647. 67 N.W.2d 801 (1955).
20 Schmerber v. California, 86 Sup. Ct. 1826, 1832 (1966) ; Smith v. United States, 324
F.2d 879 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 954 (1963); United States v. Krapf,




graphing,21 or an examination of the body of the defendant in search
of identifying characteristics."2
The leading United States Supreme Court opinion of Holt v.
United States23 supports this analysis. In this case, a witness other
than the defendant was allowed to testify that the accused had put on
a blouse and that the blouse had fit him. The defendant, stating that
this had been done under duress, contended that he had been involun-
tarily compelled to incriminate himself. The Court disagreed and
held that
the prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be witness
against himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral com-
pulsion to extort communications from him, not an exclusion of his
body as evidence when it may be material .... For when he is ex-
hibited, whether voluntarily or by order, and even if the order goes
too far, the evidence, if material, is competent.2 4
The Holt rule, having withstood the test of time, has been cited
with approval as recently as 1966.5 The blood within an individual
has also been treated as merely the "body" of said individual and
therefore outside of the protection afforded by the privilege.26 One
jurisdiction that has clearly limited the protection afforded by the
privilege, stated that "the [constitutionalI provision against self-
incrimination is limited to protection against testimonial compulsion,
and does not extend to the exclusion of the body as evidence when
such evidence may be relevant and material.""
The formulation of law requires the drawing of lines. Dis-
tinguishing between testimonial and non-testimonial evidence is no
exception to this general rule. When lines between legal and illegal
conduct are sought to be drawn, or decisions made regarding the
question of whether given evidence is testimonial or non-testimonial,
gray, borderline areas necessarily develop. 8 A correctly drawn line
21 Schmerber v. California, supra note 20; Smith v. United States, supra note 20; United
States v. Amorosa, 167 F.2d 596 (3d Cir. 1948) ; State v. Linebarger, 71 Idaho 255,
232 P.2d 669 (1951).
2 Schmerber v. California, supra note 20; McFarland v. United States, 150 F.2d 593
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 788 (1945).
23 Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 (1910).
24 Id. at 252. (Emphasis added.) Accord, Blackford v. United States, 247 F.2d 745 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 914 (1957) ; People v. Tomaszek, 54 Il. App. 2d 254,
204 N.E.2d 30 (1964).
2 Schmerber v. California, 86 Sup. Ct. 1826 '(1966).
26 See, e.g., Block v. People, 125 Colo. 36, 240 P.2d 512, cert. denied, 343 U.S. 978
(1952) (results of a sample of a defendant's blood, taken while defendant was un-
conscious, admitted into evidence) ; accord, Mestichelli v. Mestichelli, 44 Misc. 2d
707, 255 N.Y.S.2d 185 (1964) (civil action).
2 Vigil v. People, 134 Colo. 126, 129, 300 P.2d 545, 547 (1956). See also note 19 supra
and accompanying text. Contra, Cox v. State, 395 P.2d 954 (Okla. 1964).
2
8 Allen v. State, 183 Md. 603, 39 A.2d 820 (1944).
1966
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
will separate physical evidence from testimonial evidence, and by so
separating, will indicate which evidence is a proper subject for appli-
cation of the privilege against self-incrimination.
C. Results of Tests Indicating Physical Facts
It is common practice to use the results of a blood test to prove
non-paternity." Such evidence is usually considered to be real or
physical, or, using other terminology, non-testimonial rather than
testimonial. As such, the evidence is outside the protection of the
privilege.
The blood test is also used to indicate the extent of intoxication,
if any. When used for this purpose, the evidence resulting from
analysis of the blood is clearly considered to be non-testimonial, even
though taken without the consent of the supposed offender and at
the express direction of a police officer." In reaching this conclusion,
the United States Supreme Court stated,
We hold that the privilege protects an accused only from being
compelled to testify against himself, or otherwise provide the State
with evidence of a testimonal or communicative nature... and that
the withdrawal of blood and use of the analysis in question in this
case did not involve compulsion to these ends. 31
In attempting to define what is meant by the phrase "testimonial or
communicative nature," the Court offered the following explanation
in footnote five to the decision.
But the Fifth Amendment relates only to acts on the part of
the person to whom the privilege applies, and we use these words
subject to the same limitations. A nod or head-shake is as much a
'testimonial' or 'communicative' act in this sense as are spoken words.
But the terms as we use them do not apply to evidence of acts non-
communicative in nature as to the person asserting the privilege,
even though, as here, such acts are compelled to obtain the testimony
of others.32
The Court is clearly declaring this class of "blood test" evidence non-
testimonial. This should come as no surprise because such evidence
can be placed before a tribunal without utilizing the testimonial re-
sponsibility of an accused person. To forcefully remove a sample of
blood from a suspect's body is analogous to requiring fingerprinting
or examination of a defendant's body. In each case, the suspect or
defendant is required to submit to governmental authority and the
practical result of this submission is the procurement of evidence.
2Mestichelli v. Mestichelli, 44 Misc. 2d 707, 255 N.Y.S.2d 185 (1964) (civil action).
See also note 26 .upra and accompanying text.
30 Schmerber v. California, 86 Sup. Ct. 1826 (1966).
3
1 Id. at 1830-31.
32 Id. at 1830-31 n.5.
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But, such evidence is physical in nature and does not involve the tes-
timonial capacity of the defendant.
For any evidence, whether verbal or physical, to be valuable, it
must have some element of communication. One can thus conclude
that it is not what is communicated that is important, but rather the
mode of communication, since only if the mode of communication
involves testimonial responsibility can the privilege be successfully
invoked. Therefore, while all evidence communicates by conveying
useful information to the tribunal for its consideration while arriving
at a decision, such communication, even when compelled, violates no
privilege provided that the information pertains to real or physical
evidence rather than testimonial evidence.
The United States Supreme Court has recently discussed the
scope of the fifth amendment privilege in the context of testimonial
and non-testimonial compulsion.
It is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an ac-
cused's communications, whatever form they might take, and the
compulsion of responses which are also communications .... On
the other hand, both federal and state courts have usually held that
it offers no protection against compulsion to submit to finger-
printing, photographing, or measurements, to write or speak for
identification, to appear in court, to stand, to assume a stance, to
walk or to make a particular gesture. The distinction which has
emerged . . . is that the privilege is a bar against compelling 'com-
munications' or 'testimony,' but that compulsion which makes a sus-
pect or accused the source of 'real or physical evidence' does not
violate it.1
3
The Court appears to equate "communications" with "testimony,"
but it does so in a very narrow context. Testimonial communication
is within the privilege, but to be technically correct, the general term
''communication," must be equated to the general term "evidence,"
and the narrow term "testimonial communication," must be taken to
be a special kind of communication.
D. Conclusion
1. Motion Picture without a Sound Track
It will be useful to place the conclusion in the context of the
previously related hypothetical. 4 To draw the line in this borderline
situation, the question requiring an answer is whether or not the
motion picture alone was testimonial or non-testimonial.
It cannot be doubted that the conduct of the defendant at the
time of the filming of the motion picture was an essential aspect of
the issue of intoxication, subject to change by the passage of time. 5
33
1d. at 1832.
34 See note 1 supra and accompanying text.
35 See note 5 supra and accompanying text.
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Nor can it be doubted that the motion picture was intended to prove
the truth of the prosecution's allegations, i.e., for the motion picture
to have been admissible, it must have been shown that it was an accu-
rate reproduction of the scene as it actually was at the time of the
filming. 6 In effect the film is a type of witness which has been sworn
to tell or show the whole truth and nothing but the truth. The foun-
dation of authenticity which is required before the film becomes com-
petent evidence is analogous to the oath.
Consider, briefly, the pictorial nature of this cellulose "witness."
It must be noted that officers present in the interrogation room could
have testified to the demeanor, attitude and general condition of the
defendant as they had observed him. Because such testimony would
have been proper, it seems clear that the same information could have
been photographed and conveyed by means of a motion picture cam-
era. It therefore appears reasonable to conclude that the movie, when
offered to show the demeanor of the defendant, is non-testimonial
in nature and outside the protection afforded by the privilege. This is
in accord with two Texas decisions 7 wherein the Texas judiciary al-
lowed as evidence, motion pictures purporting to show the demeanor
and'bodily condition of the defendants in both cases.
2. Motion Picture with a Sound Track
The essence of the privilege against self-incrimination is the de-
fendant's right not to incriminate himself by compelled testimonial
communication. 8 In this context, it is clear that the results of some
physical tests, particularly blood tests, are non-testimonial and there-
fore outside the privilege."' However, when a defendant is asked to
submit to a blood test and refuses to do so, what begins as an attempt
to secure purely physical evidence, may result in testimonial evidence
if evidence of the defendant's refusal to cooperate is presented to the
tribunal. Evidence of such a refusal may appear in the form of a
prosecutor's comment or might be contained in the sound track of a
motion picture made at the time the defendant was being interrogated.
The issue to be resolved, therefore, is whether a vocal refusal to sub-
mit to a physical test is testimonial or non-testimonial, and if testi-
monial, whether the refusal is incriminating.
The United States Supreme Court has considered the question of
refusal to testify on several occasions, the first being Wilson v. United
States where the Court said,
36 Sec note 2 supra and accompanying text.
37 Carpenter v. State, 169 Tex. Crim. 383, 333 S.W.2d 391 (1960); Housewright v.
State, 154 Tex. Crim. 101, 225 S.W.2d 417 '(1949).
38 See note 32 supra and accompanying text.
39 See note 31 supra and accompanying text.
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The act of Congress permitting the defendant in a criminal
action to appear as a witness in his own behalf upon his request de-
clares ... that his failure to request to be a witness in the case shall
not create any presumption against him.
To prevent such presumption being created, comment, especial-
ly hostile comment, upon such failure must necessarily be excluded
from the jury. The minds of the jurors can only remain unaffected
from this circumstance by excluding all reference to it.
4
0
Wilson established only a federal rule regarding prosecution
comments on a defendant's refusal to testify. A suggested rationale
for this federal rule is that a defendant, by electing not to testify, is
exercising his privilege against self-incrimination. If this election is
subsequently commented upon, the protection offered by the privilege
will likely be destroyed by the creation of an inference of the defend-
ant's guilt in the mind of the jury. This may, in effect, result in in-
voluntary self-incrimination.
In 1963, in Malloy v. Hogan,41 the Court extended the self-in-
crimination clause of the fifth amendment to the states via the four-
teenth amendment. Two years later, in Griffin v. California,42 the
Court stated that the self-incrimination clause of the fifth amend-
ment contained the same prohibitions as the statute construed in Wil-
son, and that because of Malloy, "the Fifth Amendment, in its direct
application to the Federal Government, and in its bearing on the
States ... forbids either comment by the prosecution on the accused's
silence or instructions by the court that such silence is evidence of
guilt."
43
Aside from the previously mentioned adverse inference, if the
evidence of a refusal is conveyed by the sound track of a motion pic-
ture, there is again created the issue of involuntary self-incrimination.
This is due to the compelled testimonial nature of the sound track,
which is an authenticated reproduction of the defendant's own voice
emanating from his own lips," and recorded either without the de-
fendant's knowledge or consent, or both. The elements of testimonial
40Wilson v. United States, 149 U.S. 60, 65 (1893). The act referred to in text is set
out fully below:
That in the trial of all indictments, informations, complaints, and other
proceedings against persons charged with the commission of crimes, offenses,
and misdemeanors, in the United States courts, Territorial courts, and courts-
martial, and courts of inquiry, in any State or Territory, including the Dis-
trict of Columbia, the person so charged shall, at his own request but not
otherwise, be a competent witness. And his failure to make such request
shall not create any presumption against him.
Act of March 16, 1878, 20 Stat. 30, ch. 37.
41378 U.S. 1 (1963).
4380 U.S. 609 (1965).
43 Id. at 615. See also Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406 (1966) (Griffin
not to be applied retroactively).
44 See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
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compulsion are all present: (1) the defendant's personal appearance
in the motion picture; (2) the proven accuracy of the film substitut-
ing for the oath; and (3) an involuntary, oral communication to the
tribunal.
Little more need be said. Let it suffice to say that a sound track
should be generally inadmissible in a criminal prosecution, except
when part of a voluntary confession, because of its unmistakable com-
pelled testimonial characteristics, and it should be specifically inad-
missible when it communicates evidence of a defendant's refusal to
take physical tests and the source of the refusal is the defendant's own
voice. It is submitted that a decision contrary to these principles is
contrary to the fifth amendment of the United States Constitution.
Jerry E. McAdow
